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One hundred and thirty-five years after Parliament, in 1872, ended the legal charac­
terization of registered unions as illegal combinations in restraint of trade; sixty-nine 
years after the New Brunswick Legislature enacted the Labour Act as the forerunner of 
contemporary provincial collective bargaining legislation; and a scant thirty-five years 
after Canada ratified the ILO’s Freedom o f Association and Protection o f the Right to 
Organise Convention, 1948, the Supreme Court of Canada released its reasons for 
decision in Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association 
v. British Columbia. 1 Other contributors to this Forum will undoubtedly explore and 
explain the significance of B.C. Health Services both in terms of its reversal of posi­
tion in relation to collective bargaining as an aspect of the Charter right to freedom 
of association and in terms of its broader implications for understanding the scope of 
that right in other contexts. My contribution is far more modest—it is to examine the 
impact of B.C. Health Services since its release (8 June 2007 to 31 December 2008).
Like all Supreme Court of Canada decisions, B.C. Health Services has had 
both direct and derivative impacts: direct in the sense that it resolved a legal point of 
contention between the parties to the litigation—so there is an aftermath to report— 
and derivative in the sense that the decision has impacted on our understanding of free­
dom of association and thus on the rights of persons asserting Charter associational 
rights in other contexts.
AFTERMATH: DIRECT IMPACT
B.C. Health Services has proven costly to the government and taxpayers of Brit­
ish Columbia. In January 2008, the provincial government, through the Health 
Employers Association of British Columbia (HEABC) which represents over 
300 health care employers in the province, and the various union sectoral bargain­
ing associations completed negotiations to give effect to the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision.2 These negotiations focussed on issues pertaining to bumping, 
contracting out and layoff (the subjects of the provisions of the provincial legisla­
tion held invalid in B.C. Health Services) as well as compensation for employees
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2009).
negatively affected by the invalid provisions and new consultation mechanisms.3
The four settlement agreements apply to the sectoral associations of unions 
created for bargaining purposes pursuant to the Health Authorities Act.4 The four sec­
toral associations are: 1) the Community Bargaining Association (CBA) represent­
ing approximately 14,000 community health care and community health care sup­
port workers as well as assisted living and resident care workers; 2) the Facilities 
Bargaining Association (FBA) representing approximately 43,000 employees in a 
variety of classifications such as licensed practical nurses, food service workers and 
lab assistants; 3) the Health Science Professional Bargaining Association (HSPBA) 
representing approximately 14,000 employees such as residents and paramedics pro­
viding diagnostic, clinical and rehabilitation services and who apparently did not 
join in the constitutional litigation which became B.C. Health Services; and 4) the 
Nurses Bargaining Association (NBA) representing approximately 30,000 nurses 
(predominately registered nurses). Rather than detail each settlement agreement, 
I will present an overview and use the NBA agreement to illustrate specific points.
The public announcements of the four settlement agreements each declared 
that the “employers retain the option to contract out certain services, ensuring both 
flexibility and sustainability for healthcare.” For example, the NBA agreement states 
“the Employer may contract out non-clinical services, including when such contract­
ing out results in the lay off of employees.”5 Both the CBA and FBA agreements 
provide for employer consultation sixty days before the employer exercises its right to 
contract out work. The HSPBA and the NBA in contrast provide for potentially more 
extensive consultation reminiscent of the institutions of industrial democracy intended 
to enhance the voice of labour in the workplace. The NBA agreement provides for two 
types of consultation: 1) annual meetings of the leadership of the NBA with the deputy 
minister of health, senior health executives and the chief executive officers of the six 
regional health authorities and 2) biannual meetings of the NBA leadership with the 
administrators of the six regional health authorities. These meetings are to address “on 
a confidential basis, developments and potential initiatives” which, in relation to an­
nual meetings, “significantly affect the health sector and which may have an impact” 
on NBA members and, in relation to the biannual meetings, “which may arise within 
the Health Authority and which may have a significant impact” on NBA members.6 
This latter phrasing should clearly include the impact of contracting out. The NBA 
settlement agreement also addressed other matters pertaining to seniority, salary on 
promotion, long term disability, a three year B.S.N. program, tuition costs and profes­
sional qualifications assessment services for internationally educated nurses (IEN).7
3 Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 2, Part 2 (a.k.a. Bill 29).
4 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 180, s. 19.4 identifying the following health employment subsectors: “(a) residents;
(b) nurses; (c) paramedical professionals; (d) health services and support —  facilities subsector; (e) health 
services and support —  communities subsector.”
5 NBA Settlement Agreement 2008, article 2.1 and Appendix A, supra, note 5.
6 Ibid., article 3.1 and 3.2 (emphasis added).
7 Ibid., articles 6 ,7, 8, and 9.
All four settlement agreements provide compensation for employees adverse­
ly affected by the provisions of the unconstitutional provincial statute limiting collec­
tive bargaining rights and retraining support for individuals laid off by application of 
the impugned provisions. In exchange, each bargaining association agreed to deem re­
solved all individual and policy grievances related to the implementation of the statute 
by health employers. The combined amounts total approximately $84 million viz. CBA, 
$1.5 million in compensation and $2.5 million for retraining; FBA, $68 million and $2 
million, respectively with an additional $5 million set aside for employees impacted 
by future contracting out of services; HSPBA, $3 million for both compensation and 
retraining; and NBA, $1.8 million and $200,000, respectively. The compensation and 
retraining support will benefit the approximately 9,000 health care workers laid off by 
employers who exercised the impugned statutory management rights to contract out 
services at long term care facilities and closed other health care facilities or services.8
Final closure for the B.C. Health Services litigants came in late May 2008 
when the B.C. Legislature enacted Bill 26, the Health Statutes Amendment Act, 2008.9 
Sections 6 and 7 of this Act simply repealed the provisions of the Health and Social 
Services Delivery Improvements Act held invalid by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
B.C. Health Services.
AFTERMATH: DERIVATIVE IMPACT
In B.C. Health Services, the Supreme Court of Canada revisited the scope of the Char­
ter, section 2(d) right to freedom of association. Putting aside past decisions which 
excluded the process of collective bargaining from the scope of the right, the Court 
held, in the words of McLachlin CJC and LeBel J:
...s. 2(d) should be understood as protecting the right of employees to as­
sociate for the purpose of advancing workplace goals through a process of 
collective bargaining....
...the constitutional right to collective bargaining concerns the protection  o f  
the ability o f  workers to engage in associational activities, and  their capac­
ity to act in common  to reach shared goals related to workplace issues and 
terms of employment. In brief, the protected activity might be described as 
employees banding together to achieve particu lar w ork-related objectives.
Section 2(d) does not guarantee the particular objectives sought through this 
associational activity. However, it guarantees the process through which those 
goals are pursued. It means that employees have the right to unite, to present 
demands to health sector employers collectively and to engage in discussions
8 See “B.C. and health care unions settle 6-year dispute”, CBA News (28 January 2008) at online: <http:// 
www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2008/01/28/bc-bill29dealreached.html> (accessed 27 January
2009) and “BCNU wants to hear from members negatively affected by Bill 29”, B.C. Nurses’ Union
(13 March 2008) at <http://www.bcnu.org/whats_new_media/bulletins/2008/03-13.htm> (Accessed 26 
January 2009).
9 S.B.C. 2008, c. 34 (third reading and royal assent on 29 May 2008).
in an attempt to achieve workplace-related goals. Section 2(d) imposes cor­
responding duties on government employers to agree to meet and discuss 
with them. It also puts constraints on the exercise of legislative powers in 
respect of the right to collective bargaining... [emphasis added]10
As expressed in this excerpt, freedom of association supports the freedom of 
expression of employees in relation to workplace issues and, as the Court develops 
in its reasons for decision, is supported by a corresponding duty on the employer 
to hear (meet) and to bargain in good faith.11 This explanation ‘sounds’ of the US 
approach to freedom of association as a penumbra or derivative right inextricably 
linked to and supporting the freedoms of religion, expression, and peaceful assem­
bly. As further noted by the Court, freedom of association is triggered only by state 
action and is subject to an internal limitation that interference with the freedom be 
“substantial”.12 One may be forgiven for thinking immediately of the Quebec Seces­
sion Reference as the model for this view of expression and association—that opin­
ion also requiring good faith bargaining in response to the positive expression by a 
clear majority to a clear question favouring international sovereignty and secession 
from Canada.13 The duty to consult in matters of Aboriginal law also comes to mind.
Differently stated, freedom of association is perceived as a process of free dis­
cussion to achieve a goal but not the goal itself. In making this determination, the Court 
applied a contextual approach which drew upon the historical, social, and international 
law contexts in which the pivotal significance of collective bargaining is affirmed. It 
should not necessarily follow, however, that B.C Health Services should be limited to 
the collective bargaining context. Surely, the procedural aspect of the freedom extends 
to other non-workplace situations and interests. Thus, it is helpful to examine the ju­
risprudence to learn if B.C. Health Services has been interpreted broadly or narrowly.
To prepare this forum contribution, I arbitrarily decided to rely on the “note 
up” feature on CanLII to identify court and tribunal decisions referencing B.C. Health 
Services and I did this three times. As of 8 November 2008, the list of decisions stood 
at twenty-three; as of 6 January 2009, at thirty-six; and as of 17 January 2009, at thirty- 
eight. As these statistics indicate, there seems to have been a clearance of reserved de­
cisions as the end of the year approached—and, I hasten to add, not by CanLII but by 
the courts and other tribunals. The thirty-eight relevant decisions during the eighteen 
months period between the release of B.C. Health Services in June 2007 and the end 
of Dember 2008 are geographically spread over six of the thirteen Canadian jurisdic­
tions: federal Canada - three; British Columbia - nine; Alberta - four; Ontario - six; 
Quebec - fifteen; and Newfoundland and Labrador - one. In hierarchical terms, B.C. 
Health Services is referenced nine times by three courts of appeal; ten times by four
10 Supra, note 1, at paras. 87 and 89.
11 Ibid., at para. 90.
12 Ibid.
13 [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, the Quebec Secession Reference is neither discussed nor cited in B.C. Health 
Services.
superior courts; and nineteen times by six labour boards or, in the case of Quebec, the 
labour court.
Of the thirty-eight relevant decisions, B.C. Health Services is given only a 
passing reference in thirty-four decisions. Four Quebec decisions can be immediately 
put aside because B.C. Health Services is merely mentioned in a footnote or included 
in a list of authorities.14 One of these decisions, before the Commission de la function 
publique, presented a challenge by an association of crown attorneys to an employer’s 
decision to deny the association permission to continue as priority user of a specific 
room in the courthouse for association activities.15 The Commission did not find it 
necessary to address the Charter section 2(d) nor the Québec Charter section 3. It con­
sidered the separate agreement by which the association gained priority access to the 
room not to be within the Commission’s jurisdiction because the issue as presented did 
not involve the interpretation, application or breach of the association’s agreement in 
relation to the terms and conditions of employment of the attorneys; it was a privilege 
created by a separate agreement much as any user might acquire. Had the Commis­
sion concluded that it had jurisdiction, the question to be decided would have been 
whether freedom of association includes an obligation on the employer to support 
associational activities by providing meeting space. While the history of labour rela­
tions in Canada and elsewhere confirms the importance to the exercise of associational 
activities that a space be available for such purposes, the Commission might have 
decided that freedom of association protects only the right to ask for meeting space.
Eight decisions in the passing reference category mentioned B.C. Health Ser­
vices with or without a brief quotation and definitely without analysis. Six of these 
decisions are by specialist labour tribunals; one by a provincial superior court (Al­
berta); and one by the Quebec Court of Appeal. In seven of these decisions, freedom 
of association and B.C. Health Services were mentioned as part of the background 
to the procedural issue for determination (i.e. deciding whether to grant standing to 
an intervenor or whether to bifurcate the hearing into two stages addressing first the 
substantive merits and then the constitutional issue); the case is included in a list of 
authorities without further comment; or the matter is decided without considering the 
constitutional issue.16 The eighth deserves special mention if only for its notoriety.
14 In a footnote: Associations des substituts du Procureur général du Québec c. Québec (Justice) 2007 
CanLII 47799 (Québec - Commission de la fonction publique) and Poissant et CH Le Gardeur, 2008 
QCCLP (CanLII) (Québec - Commission des lésions professionnelles du Québec); in a list of authorities: 
Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse c. Centre à la petite enfance Gros Bec, 
2008 QCTDP 14 (Québec Human Rights Tribunal) and Commission des droits de la personne et des droits 
de la jeunesse c. Gaz métropolitain inc., 2008 QCTDP 24 (CanLII) (Québec Human Rights Tribunal).
15 Associations des substituts du Procureur général du Québec c. Québec (Justice), ibid.
16 Independent Electricity Market Operator v. Canadian Union o f Skilled Workers, 2007 CanLII 26275 
(ON L.R.B.); International Brotherhood o f Electrical Workers, Local Union 424 v. Basilian Industrial 
Services Ltd., 2008 CanLII 51099 (AB L.R.B.); Alliance du personnel professionnel et technique de la 
santé et des services sociaux (CPS et APTMQ) c. Syndicat des professionnelles et professionnels de la 
santé publique du Québec (CSQ), 2008 QCCRT 228 (CanLII); Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons ’ 
International Association of the United States and Canada, Local 222 v. Alberta (Human Resources and 
Employment), 2008 ABQB 225 (CanLII); Health Employers Association o f British Columbia on Behalf o f  
Renfrew Care Centre Partnership (Renfrew Care Centre) v. British Columbia Nurses ’ Union, 2007 CanLII
Plourde c. Compagnie Wal-Mart du Canada inc. is the rather infamous case concern­
ing Wal-Mart’s decision to close its store in Jonquière, Quebec after a union had been 
certified as bargaining agent on behalf of its non-management employees.17 The Com­
mission des relations du travail found in favour of the employer on a complaint by a 
former employee, and the Court of Appeal, per Rochon JA, refused leave to appeal 
that decision. The Commission had found that closing the store constituted a “good 
and sufficient reason” within the meaning of the provincial labour code to relieve 
the employer of the presumption that it acted to interfere with its employees’ union 
activity.18 Rochon JA referred to B.C. Health Services to support his rejection of the 
‘syllogism’ argued on behalf of the employee: the statutory presumption applies to 
activities protected by the labour code; these activities are expressions of freedom of 
association; therefore, these activities are protected by freedom of association. The 
Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal and heard oral argument on 21 Janu­
ary 2009. Interestingly, the following sentence appears in the summary of the case as 
published in the Supreme Court of Canada Bulletin: “Whether employer may close 
its business or part thereof for clearly anti-union reasons without suffering any con­
sequences despite infringement of freedom of association of employees concerned.”19
Six decisions in this category identify B.C. Health Services as informing the 
analytical approach to the bargaining unit certification or collective bargaining issue 
under consideration.20 These are three decisions of the B.C. Labour Relations Board, 
two of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and one of the Ontario Court of Appeal. A 
further eight decisions refer to B.C. Health Services in relation to a non-2(d) aspect of 
the Charter, section 1 justification analysis, section 15 equality rights, and the burden
48186 (BC L.R.B.); Professional Institute o f the Public Service o f  Canada v. Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency, 2008 PSLRB 78 (CanLII); and Western Regional Integrated Health Authority v. Newfoundland 
and Labrador Association o f Public and Private Employees, 2008 CanLII 68037 (NL L.R.B.).
17 2007 QCCA 1210 (CanLII).
18 Labour Code, R.S.Q., c. C-27, art. 17: “If it is shown to the satisfaction o f the Commission that the 
employee exercised a right arising from this Code, there is a simple presumption in his favour that the 
sanction was imposed on him or the action was taken against him because he exercised such right, and the 
burden of proof is upon the employer that he resorted to the sanction or action against the employee for 
good and sufficient reason.”
19 Supreme Court o f Canada, Bulletin o f Proceedings (23 January 2009) at 90-91.
20 NGN Triple Productions Inc. v. British Columbia and Yukon Council o f  Film Unions, 2008 CanLII 
53036 (BC L.R.B.) (employer application to delay certification hearing pending other proceedings); Great 
Pacific Industries Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, Local 1518, 2008 
CanLII 21703 (BC L.R.B.) (determining membership o f bargaining unit for purposes o f strike vote);
C.K. Fibres Corp. v. Construction and Specialized Workers ' Union Local 1611,2008 CanLII 66083 (BC 
L.R.B.) (alleged anti-union activity by employer between date o f application for certification and date
o f certification vote); Collins & Aikman Automotive Canada Inc. (Re), 2007 CanLII 45908 (ON S.C.) 
(insolvent employer and contributions to employee pension plan); Birch v. Union o f  Taxation Employees, 
Local 70030,2008 ONCA 809 (CanLII) (jurisdiction o f court to enforce fines levied by union against 
members - majority hold unenforceable as a penalty clause; Juriansz J.A. in dissent at para. 101, cites B.C. 
Health Services to support conclusion that common law rule against penalty clause not applicable in union 
setting giving constitutional recognition o f value o f collective bargaining); and Association o f Justices o f  
the Peace o f  Ontario v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2008 CanLII 26258 (ON S.C.) (mandatory retirement 
and justices o f the peace).
of proof.21 Two other decisions make passing reference to Health Services in relation 
to the scope of freedom of association and to the history of collective bargaining in 
Canada, respectively.22
The six decisions to be accounted for in the ‘passing reference’ category all 
address in some manner a group of persons or a series of issues excluded from the 
exercise of associational rights related to collective bargaining. Among the groups are 
prostitutes, lawyers, non-bargaining administrative and professional staff, members of 
a cooperative, and persons claiming Métis status. The excluded issues are “appoint­
ment, appraisal, promotion and classification” of federal public service employees.
In Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society v. At­
torney General (Canada), an association of sex workers were denied the opportunity 
to challenge the criminalization of prostitution activities when the Supreme Court of 
British Columbia granted an application by crown counsel to dismiss the proceed­
ings for want of standing.23 The association brought its application for a declaration 
that the prostitution provisions of the Criminal Code (sections 210 to 213) are un­
constitutional limitations on their, inter alia, Charter section 2(d) rights. They as­
serted that the Criminal Code provisions “prevent and/or limit sex workers from 
joining together in furtherance of a common goal, namely the goal of improving 
and controlling working conditions, including safety and security... from engaging
21 Morrow v. Zhang, 2008 ABQB 98 (CanLII) (section 1 analysis is contextual) [without referring to B.C. 
Health Services on this point, this decision divined that a cap on non-pecuniary damages for soft tissue 
injuries demeans human dignity within the meaning of the Charter, section 15 equality rights]; H.N. c. 
Québec (Ministre de I’Education), 2007 QCCA 1111 (CanLII) (section 1 rational connection step referring 
to B.C. Health Services at para. 148 that the step is ‘not particularly onerous’) and Withler v. Canada 
(Attorney General), 2008 BCCA 539 (CanLII) (re statement o f legislative objective referring to B.C.
Health Services, para. 146);
Three judgments of the Quebec Court of Appeal released on 9 August 2007: Association des policiers 
provinciaux du Québec c. Sûreté du Québec, 2007 QCCA 1087 (CanLII); Fraternité des policières et 
policiers de Montréal c. Sûreté du Québec, 2007 QCCA 1086 (CanLII); and Fédération des policières 
et policiers municipaux du Québec c. Sûreté du Québec, 2007 QCCA 1088 (CanLII). The issue in the 
first appeal decision concerned equality rights in the context of the dismissal o f a police officer following 
conviction for a criminal offence. The Court o f Appeal addressed the equality rights argument by referring 
to B.C. Health Services at para. 165 where McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel J. state “The differential and 
adverse effects of the legislation on some groups of workers relate essentially to the type of work they do, 
and not to the persons they are ... the differential treatment based on personal characteristics required to 
get a discrimination analysis off the ground is absent here.”;
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation v. Attorney General o f  British Columbia, 2008 BCSC 1699 
(CanLII) (scope of relevant background documents to identify legislative purpose) and Professional 
Institute o f the Public Service o f Canada v. Treasury Board and Canada Revenue Agency, 2008 PSLRB 13 
(CanLII) (alleged breach of Charter section 2(d) not supported by complainant analysis or argument).
22 Allied Hydro Council v. Construction, Maintenance and Allied Workers Bargaining Council, Local 
2300,2008 BCSC 1660 (CanLII) (no evidence that ability to engage in good faith bargaining substantially 
impaired by legislated reorganization o f trade union council) and Blair c. Syndicat des cols bleus 
regroupés de Montréal (SCFP, 301), 2007 QCCRT 439 (CanLII) (expulsion of bargaining unit employees 
from union membership because o f conduct during election of union officers is internal matter not 
involving state action).
23 2008 BCSC 1726 (CanLII).
in associational activities and from doing collectively what they may otherwise le­
gitimately do individually.” In granting the Crown’s application to dismiss, the 
Court held that even accepting the existence of a serious issue as to constitutional 
validity and that the association demonstrated a genuine interest in the matter, there 
were other reasonable and effective means to bring a constitutional challenge be­
fore the courts. The Court noted that, unlike the instant matter in which no one ac­
knowledged actually being a sex worker, litigation was pending in other provinces 
in which standing was not in issue because at least one of the applicants had direct 
standing because she asserted that she was “currently engaged in prostitution”.24
In an interlocutory matter, the Quebec Commission des relations du Travail 
dismissed a motion by counsel for the treasury board to suspend proceedings brought 
by lawyers and other professional employees claiming that provisions of the provin­
cial public sector labour relations legislation infringed their associational rights and 
that their employer had not negotiated in good faith. The Commission, in brief rea­
sons for decision in Association des juristes de l ’État c. Québec (Conseil du Trésor), 
quoted from B.C. Health Services regarding the nature and scope of freedom of as­
sociation in relation to collective bargaining.25 It then concluded in favour of continu­
ing the proceedings notwithstanding that parallel proceedings had been commenced 
before the superior court challenging the constitutional validity of the legislation.
Perhaps the two most significant decisions in the “passing reference” cat­
egory are Association o f Administrative and Professional Staff v. University o f British 
Columbia and Coopérative des travailleurs(euses) de Sacré-Cœur c. Syndicat cana­
dien des communications, de l ’énergie et du papier, section locale 1229 decided in 
September 2008 by the B.C. Court of Appeal and in November 2008 by the Quebec 
Tribunal du Travail, respectively.26 The UBC case concerned a voluntary recognition 
agreement between the employer university and its non-bargaining employees. On 
the basis that agreement described these employees as members of a ‘bargaining unit’ 
and addressed terms and conditions of employment, the Association characterized it 
as a ‘collective agreement’. The instant case arose when two managers, members 
of the Association, were held by an adjudicator to have been terminated without just 
cause but were subject to a cap on severance pay established under provincial public 
sector employment legislation—an amount less than that provided by the voluntary 
recognition agreement.27 The legislated cap did not apply to employees covered by 
a collective agreement. Hence, the question in issue was essentially one of statutory 
interpretation—did the Association represent a ‘bargaining unit’ within the meaning of
24 Ibid., at para. 7 5 .1 fail to see why pending litigation elsewhere should be such a controlling factor 
to defeat standing for these applicants or the applicant association. They applied to the B.C. court for 
its adjudication of the issue and should not be left to rely on the analysis o f an Ontario court. Surely 
federalism does not mandate such a limitation on access to judicial resources.
25 2007 QCCRT 553 (CanLII).
26 2008 BCCA 337 (CanLII); 2008 CanLII 59474 (QC T.T.).
27 Public Sector Employers Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 384 and the Employment Termination Standards 
Regulation, B.C. Reg. 379/97.
the provincial legislation? The adjudicator had found that the meaning of ‘bargaining 
unit’ was the same under the public sector legislation as under the provincial labour 
code. Though the appeal to the Court of Appeal technically turned on the exercise of 
discretion by the superior court justice not to grant leave to appeal, the adjudicator’s 
decision, which was adverse to the Association, nonethless addressed the relevance of 
B.C. Health Services as follows:
The Supreme Court of Canada traced the history of collective bargaining 
in Canada as now protected by labour legislation and the modem system of 
labour relations. That system has as its primary vehicle a recognized bar­
gaining agent—a  union o r association—with the statutory right to bargain  
collectively fo r  em ployees. Here, the parties agreed these two managers did 
not come within the definition of employee in British Columbia’s Labour 
Relations Code. That is, they do not derive the benefit of that statutory 
labour relations scheme. I do not consider the Health Services  case ad­
vances the cause of the employees in this case, [emphasis added]
Thus, the Court advanced a narrow approach to B.C. Health Services, re­
stricting its application to the statutory collective bargaining process. This was a 
fatal determination because the Association was not certified under provincial la­
bour relations legislation as a ‘bargaining agent’ and the adjudication proceed­
ings had taken place under the Commercial Arbitration Act rather than labour re­
lations legislation.28 That the Association had exercised the associational rights 
of its members to achieve a higher level of severance pay did not seem to bother 
the Court of Appeal because of the legislated public sector cap. But is that not ex­
actly what occurred in B.C. Health Services itself—provincial legislation over­
rode negotiated provisions of negotiated labour agreements? The only difference 
seems to be that B.C. Health Services arose within the statutory collective bar­
gaining regime and the UBC case concerned a voluntary recognition agreement.
In Coopérative, the Labour Court referred to and relied on the UBC appeal 
decision and extensively on B.C. Health Services. The cooperative, which owned a 
one third interest in a wood processing plant, entered into an agreement by which 
members of the cooperative could work at the plant. They would work under condi­
tions established by an agreement between the plant owners and the cooperative which 
the cooperative adopted as a bylaw governing its members for the purposes of the 
provincial cooperatives legislation. Approximately fifteen years later, a union sought 
to be certified as bargaining agent for the plant workers and took the position that the 
cooperative and plant owner were in fact co-employers. The Labour Tribunal granted 
the certification application with the employer identified as the plant owner alone. The 
plant owner and cooperative successfully appealed to the Labour Court which held the 
cooperative members not to be employees within the meaning of the provincial labour 
code. The superior court granted judicial review and reversed that decision, holding
28 R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 55.
the cooperative members to be employees, and the Court of Appeal dismissed an ap­
peal, as did the Supreme Court of Canada.29 When the matter came again on appeal to 
the Labour Court, the Judge interpreted B. C. Health Services to support the following 
proposition:
[83] La garantie de liberté d’association n’implique pas le droit de revendi­
quer un modèle particulier de relations de travail à l’extérieur des législations 
provinciales en vigueur ou encore une méthode particulière de négociation 
collective. F.nfin, seule une atteinte substantielle à la liberté d’association peut 
justifier l’examen judiciaire des dispositions législatives attaquées.
Thus, the cooperative, not being a certified bargaining agent under provin­
cial labour legislation, was not the proper legal vehicle to represent the cooperative 
members for the purposes of collective bargaining. As a cooperative under provin­
cial legislation, the cooperative “a pour objet de fournir du travail à ses membres 
dans le domaine de la transformation du bois d’œuvre et tous autres domaines conne­
xes et de pourvoir à l’éducation coopérative sociale et économique de ses mem­
bres.” The significance to be drawn from Coopérative, in combination with UBC, 
is that, as the quotation above reflects, freedom of association does not necessarily 
include the form of the associational vehicle. This is consistent with the majority 
opinion expressed by Bastarache J in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General):
Freedom of association does not include the right to establish a particu­
lar type of association defined in a particular statute; this kind of recogni­
tion would unduly limit the ability of Parliament or a provincial legisla­
ture to regulate labour relations in the public service and would subject 
employers, without their consent, to greater obligations toward the asso­
ciation than toward their employees individually.30
This last quotation proved decisive in the Métis membership case, Peavine Mé­
tis Settlement v. Alberta (Minister o f Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development)?x 
Eight individuals who had been registered members of the Peavine Métis community 
were removed from the membership list, at the request of the community council, when 
they were registered as status Indians for the purposes of the Indian Act.32 Approximate­
ly four years later, the council reversed its position and requested that the individuals be 
re-registered as members of the Peavine Métis community for the purposes of the Métis
29 Boisaco Inc. c. Section locale 1229 du Syndicat canadien des communications, de l ’énergie et 
du papier, Procureur général du Québec - et - Coopérative des travailleurs(euses) de Sacré-Coeur 
(UNISACO) et tribunal du travail - ET ENTRE - Coopérative des travailleurs(euses) de Sacré-Coeur 
(UNISACO) c. Section locale 1229 du Syndicat canadien des communications, de l ’énergie et du papier 
et Procureur général du Québec - et - Tribunal du Travail et Boisaco Inc., Supreme Court of Canada, 
Bulletin o f Proceedings (5 October 2007) (date o f decision on leave application: 4 October 2007) per 
Bastarache, LeBel et Fish JJ.
30 [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, at para. 33.
31 2007 ABQB 517, 81 Alta. L.R. (4th) 28.
32 R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
Settlement Act.™ When the registrar refused the request—because of the membership 
rules excluding status Indians from Métis community membership—the council joined 
with the individuals to seek a declaration, inter alia, that their Charter right to freedom 
of association had been infringed by the statutory membership rules. The reasons for 
decision of the Queen’s Bench justice rely primarily on a Dunmore claim and analy­
sis.34 B.C. Health Services is discussed for the purpose of distinguishing the case rather 
than applying it. Having referred to the quotation above from Delisle, Shelley J stated:
Similarly, freedom of association does not include the right to belong to a 
particular type of association created by statute and which defines specific 
criteria for membership.35
She then distinguished B.C. Health Services by observing that it concerned a right 
to collective bargaining which had been recognized but not created by the leg­
islative scheme in contrast to a claim to Métis membership which, she found, 
does not exist apart from the legislative scheme. The Court found no breach 
of freedom of association or of any other right and dismissed the application.
The sole decision remaining in the ‘passing reference’ category is Profes­
sional Institute o f the Public Service o f Canada v. Treasury Board which concerned 
delimitation of the terms of reference to an arbitration board.36 The employer objected 
to a union request to include in the terms of reference consideration of a proposed pay 
plan study because such a study strayed into areas excluded by the governing legisla­
tion from the determination of an arbitration board. The legislation, the federal Public 
Service Labour Relations Act (like its provincial counterparts) directs that an arbitral 
award is not to “alter or eliminate any existing term or condition of employment, or es­
tablish any new term or condition of employment, if...(c) the term or condition relates 
to standards, procedures or processes governing the appointment, appraisal, promotion, 
deployment, rejection on probation or lay-off of employees”.37 The union invoked B. C. 
Health Services to support its position regarding the proposed pay study but the labour 
board agreed with the employer that the statutory provision applied to limit the scope 
of the reference to arbitration. The labour board, however, found that referring the pay 
plan study would not per se infringe the statutory prohibitions—a study is merely a 
study—and it would be for the arbitration board itself to determine whether to include 
elements of the study in its award being always mindful of its governing legislation.
Of the thirty-eight decisions in the set of relevant decisions, only four re­
main; those in which B.C. Health Services is given more than ‘passing reference’. 
These decisions emanate from an arbitrator in Ontario, the Ontario Court of Appeal
33 R.S.A. 2000, c. M-14, as amended.
34 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2001 SCC 94, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016.
35 Supra note 34, at para. 80.
36 2008 PSLRB 72 (CanLII).
37 S.C. 2003, c. 22, section 150(l)(c).
and the Superior Court of Quebec, twice.
The earliest is that of the arbitrator and involved an argument that the Su­
preme Court of Canada erred in B.C. Health Services because the analysis focussed 
on ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association to the exclusion of ILO Convention 
98, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949, a convention 
not ratified by Canada. Durham Regional Police Association v. Regional Municipality 
o f Durham Police Services Board concerned a preliminary motion to determine, under 
the Ontario Police Services Act (“PSA”), the arbitrability of levels of deployment of 
police officers during day and night shifts.38 The issue concerned the proper charac­
terization of the subject of deployment—was it inarbitrable because the Act restricted 
the employer police board from directing a police chief in relation to operational de­
cisions, or was it arbitrable as a “working condition’? Ontario police boards, per 
the PSA section 119(3), are authorized to negotiate with the association representing 
members of the police force on questions of “remuneration, pensions, sick leave credit 
gratuities and grievance procedures... and [with some exceptions] their working condi­
tions.” The Durham police board had negotiated and reached agreement with the po­
lice association on the numbers of officers to be deployed during day and night shifts. 
When the renewal negotiations reached an impasse and the matter was referred to 
interest arbitration, the police board and the intervenor chief of police argued that the 
deployment provisions were invalid as contrary to the PSA exclusion of operational 
decisions. In this context, the police association relied on B.C. Health Services to sup­
port its position that collective bargaining is protected by freedom of association and 
that staffing is a core subject of collective bargaining in relation to working conditions. 
It was in response to this position that the police chief argued that police are excluded 
from the right to collective bargaining by ILO Contention 98, article 5, paragraph 1:
The extent to which the guarantees provided for in this Convention shall 
apply to the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national 
laws or regulations.
Recognizing the effect of the PSA in permitting bargaining, the 
chief argued that the association and its members enjoyed no right to col­
lective bargaining other than that provided by statute i.e. it had no consti­
tutional basis and could be limited or removed by statute without infring­
ing the Charter right.39 The arbitrator responded to these arguments by noting:
I am mindful of the suggestions in the Chief’s submissions to the effect 
that the Supreme Court may have misapplied the principles of the ILO con­
ventions in upholding certain rights to collective bargaining, particularly 
in the policing sector. In the best of circumstances I would be reluctant to 
pronounce that the Supreme Court of Canada was mistaken or misguided.
38 International Labour Organization, C98 Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention,
1949; 2007 CanLII 27333 (ON L.A.), 164 L.A.C. (4th) 225; R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15.
39 Supra, note 38 at para. 62.
However, in this particular case, I am not convinced that the authority cited 
by the Chief supports that conclusion... while the right to collective bar­
gaining should be recognized in the private and public sectors, that right 
is excluded from police and armed forces under ILO Convention 98. This 
does not mean that where there is a  right to collective bargaining recog­
nized in the p o lice  sector by the legislative schem e o f  a  province, the gen­
eral principles concerning collective bargaining do not ap p ly  I t was those  
general principles that the Supreme Court o f  Canada was applying and  
that prov ide  an interpretive guide in this case, [emphasis added]
The interest arbitrator ultimately concluded that staffing issues relating to personnel 
deployment are covered by the phrase “working conditions” and are properly subject 
to bargaining.
The three remaining decisions all relate to constitutional challenges to leg­
islation enacted before B.C. Health Services clarified the scope of freedom of as­
sociation in relation to collective bargaining. All three decisions—one from the 
Ontario Court of Appeal and two from the Quebec Superior Court—rely exten­
sively on the reasons for decision in B.C. Health Services and all declare the chal­
lenged legislation in breach of the right to freedom of association and not justi­
fied by Charter section 1 analysis. None of these decisions is surprising. The 
decisions concern workers in the fields of health care, agriculture, and child care.
Chronologically, the first is the November 2007 Quebec Superior Court deci­
sion in Confédération des syndicats nationaux c. Québec (Procureur général) (here­
after CSN 7).40 By legislation enacted in 2003, the government sought to rationalize 
collective bargaining in the provincial health and social sectors by replacing a system 
with 3,542 bargaining units representing more than 200,000 employees at 425 institu­
tions with a new structure involving four sectoral bargaining units within each institu­
tion resulting in a relatively modest 782 individual bargaining units.41 This legislative 
initiative was in response to a recommendation of a provincial commission on health 
and social services delivery which drew attention to the problems presented by, inter 
alia, multiple bargaining units represented by different bargaining agents within the 
same institution, representing similar employees, and using different job classifica­
tions in relation to similar job functions. At the same time, the government promot­
ed further rationalization by legislation reorganizing the regional health authorities.
The challenged Act substituted the four statutory bargaining units for the bar­
gaining units certified by the Commission des relations du travail using the familiar cri­
teria developed in the labour jurisprudence. The four legislated bargaining units were: 
1) nursing and cardio-respiratory care; 2) paratechnical, auxiliary services and trades;
40 2007 QCCS 5513 (CanLII).
41 An Act respecting Bargaining Units in the Social Affairs Sector and Amending the Act respecting the 
Process o f Negotiation o f the Collective Agreements in the Public and Parapublic Sectors, S.Q. 2003, c.
25 (Bill 30); Supra, note 40, at para. 21.
3) office, administrative and related professionals; and 4) health and social services 
technicians, including nurses and nursing assistants.42 In addition, to decentralize ele­
ments of collective bargaining, the Act also declared twenty-six matters to be subject 
to obligatory local or regional negotiation resolved, if necessary, by compulsory me- 
diation-arbitration if the parties do not reach agreement within twenty-four months.43
The Commission des relations du travail rejected the union position that the 
Act infringed freedom of association based on the state of the law pre-B. C. Health Ser­
vices but, with B.C. Health Services, the Superior Court had no difficulty in declaring 
the statutory provisions of no force and effect. The statutory reorganization of the bar­
gaining units had occurred without consultation—in fact, the Bill had been amended 
to reduce the number of bargaining units from the originally proposed five to the final 
four. In so doing, the legislature had substituted its decision for the free exercise by 
employees of the right to freedom of association. The Court illustrated some adverse 
effects of the statutory reorganization. The Syndicat professionnel des diététistes et 
nutritionnistes du Québec, as a stand alone union represented 90 percent of dietitians 
and nutritionists, but under the reorganization found themselves swamped in the larger 
fourth bargaining unit with only 0.03 percent of the new bargaining unit member­
ship.44 At the same time, nurses, a group with a long history of their own union, were 
joined into a common bargaining unit with nursing assistants and forced to associate 
with “des personnes avec qui elles ont des différends sérieux.” While recognizing 
that freedom of association in relation to the right to form and join trade unions im­
plicitly involves freedom to determine the structure and composition of unions, the 
Court also recognized that mere reduction in the number of bargaining units does not 
per se infringe freedom of association. The defects amounting to substantial interfer­
ence with the right, however, were that the legislature had negated the free association 
of employees with common goals and aspirations by combining apparently mutually 
antagonistic groups of employees and had, without consultation, interfered with the 
procedural aspects of collective bargaining by requiring bargaining units and employ­
ers to negotiate specific subjects at the local or regional level, including such items as 
the length of probationary periods, the schedule of working hours, and the definition 
of a temporary vacancy.
The Court accepted the legislative goal of improving performance, qual­
ity, and access to health care as pressing and substantial and found the goal and 
the means rationally connected for the purposes of the Oakes justification anal­
ysis but held the Act did not minimally impair the right in issue and did not pass 
the overall proportionality test. The evidence did not support a finding that the 
government had considered other more minimally impairing alternatives such as 
achieving rationality by promoting common job classifications across bargain­
ing units. The Court suspended its declaration of invalidity for eighteen months
42 Supra, note 41, section 4.
43 Ibid., section sections 35 et seq, section 67 and Schedule A .l.
44 Supra, note 40, at para. 293.
to permit the legislature to amend the legislation consistent with the Charter.
It is helpful to observe that the Court relied on the reasoning in B.C. 
Health Services but supported its approach by repeated references to and quo­
tations from the opinions and recommendations of the ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association, the first of the decisions discussed so far to do so.
A second Confédération des syndicats nationaux c. Québec (Procureur gé­
néral) (hereafter CSN 2) arrived on the scene in late October 2008.45 In December 
2003, the same month the legislation was held invalid in CSN 7, the legislature en­
acted amendments to existing legislative regimes governing 1) workers, who in their 
own home, provide accommodation, care and support to at least nine persons, and 2) 
workers who provide child care in a private residence. The amendments, inter alia, 
declared such workers not to be “employees” of any public institution using their 
services or of the childcare centre permit holder, respectively, and declared, in re­
lation to the former group, that any agreement regarding “terms and conditions” re 
“activities and services” is “deemed not to constitute a contract of employment”.46
The important contextual feature to this Charter challenge is these 
amendments came at a time when the CSN had successfully conducted a union­
ization campaign in relation to both groups of workers, had successfully certi­
fied certain bargaining units, and had commenced negotiations towards realiz­
ing collective agreements. Needless to say, both groups are predominantly female, 
minimally paid, and without pension or other benefits normally seen as routine. 
As noted by the Court, the work performed by these valuable members of soci­
ety was historically treated as a form of volunteerism before its eventual integra­
tion into the public sphere by legislation establishing government subsidies and 
mandated standards, including professionalization of specific classes of workers.
Again, the Court relied heavily on B. C. Health Services to support its analy­
sis. But, it had the additional benefit of the views of the ILO Committee on Freedom 
of Association on the impugned legislation. Following analysis of union complaints, 
the ILO Committee had declared the legislation in breach of freedom of association.47 
The Committee expressed the opinion that, like other workers, these workers should
45 2008 QCCS 5076 (CanLII).
46 An Act to amend the Act respecting Health Services and Social Services, S.Q. 2003, c. 12, section
1 and An Act to amend the Act respecting Childcare Centres and Childcare Services, S.Q. 2003, c. 13, 
section 1 (emphasis added).
47 “Cases Nos. 2314 and 2333 (Canada/Quebec): Report in which the Committee requests to be kept 
informed of developments Complaints against the Government o f Canada concerning the Province of 
Quebec presented by the Confederation o f National Trade Unions (CSN), supported by Public Services 
International (PSI) (Case No. 2314), the Centre of Democratic Trade Unions (CSD), the Quebec Trade 
Union Centre (CSQ) and the Quebec Workers’ Federation (FTQ) (Case No. 2333)” in ILO, Reports of 
the Committee on Freedom o f Association, 340th Report o f the Committee on Freedom of Association 
(Geneva: ILO, March 2006) at paras. 373-432.
have access to the normal collective bargaining regime of the provincial Labour Code; 
that such workers are not within excluded categories such as the armed forces and 
police as provided by ILO Convention No. 87 (discussed above); that cancellation 
of certification as bargaining agent is contrary to freedom of association; and that 
the forms of consultation provided by the legislation did not constitute ‘genuine’ col­
lective bargaining.48 The Court easily rebuffed the government’s argument that the 
workers were seeking access to a specific legislative regime of collective bargaining 
under the Labour Code. The effect of the statutory deeming provisions was to remove 
existing certifications and effectively terminate negotiations for collective agreements. 
The Court declared that these otherwise vulnerable workers were not seeking access to 
a specific statutory regime but simply access to a regime of collective bargaining. The 
deeming provision had the further negative impact of removing these workers from 
the protection of other employment-related legislation.49 Finally, the Court concluded 
that, in the absence of any evidence of disruption of service delivery after union or­
ganizing and certification, the government’s objective of promoting effective health, 
safety, and child development did not constitute a pressing and substantial objective 
because the children were always safe and their health and development continued as 
before. Even assuming such an objective, the Court was not satisfied that any of the 
rational connection, minimal impairment or overall proportionality steps of the Oakes 
justification analysis had been satisfied. Indeed, in relation to rational connection, the 
Court considered that denial of access to collective bargaining could, for this group 
of vulnerable workers, have a negative impact on the quality of services provided.
The third decision in this category is that of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in Fraser v. Attorney General o f Ontario, a challenge to the validity of the legis­
lative response to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Dunmore.50 The On­
tario government and legislature apparently took a literal approach to the statement 
of Bastarache J in Dunmore regarding the minimum requirements to respect the 
right of freedom of association of vulnerable agricultural workers in that province: 
“freedom to assemble, to participate in the lawful activities of the association and 
to make representations, and the right to be free from interference, coercion and dis­
crimination in the exercise of these freedoms.”51 Thus, the legislative response, the 
Agricultural Employees Protection Act, 2002, section 1(2) listed the rights protected:
1. The right to form or join an employees’ association.
2. The right to participate in the lawful activities of an employees’ association.
3. The right to assemble.
4. The right to make representations to their employers, through an employ-
48 Supra, note 45, at paras. 303-309.
49 For example, employment standards and occupational health and safety legislation.
50 2008 ONCA 760 (CanLII) (17 November 2008).
51 Dunmore, supra, note 34 at para. 67.
ees’ association, respecting the terms and conditions of their employment.
5. The right to protection against interference, coercion and dis­
crimination in the exercise of their rights.52
The Act, per section 5, also required employers to “give an employees’ association a 
reasonable opportunity to make representations respecting the terms and conditions 
of employment” and obliged the employer to “listen to the representations if made 
orally, or read them if made in writing.” The Act, per section 11, conferred jurisdic­
tion on the Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal to inquire into com­
plaints that an employer had breached the Act and conferred authority on the Tribunal 
“determine what, if anything, the... employer... shall do or refrain from doing with 
respect to the contravention” supported with the authority to order remedial action.
Winkler C JO, for the Court, applied B. C. Health Services to justify the con­
clusion that the Act unjustifiably infringed the right of agricultural workers to bar­
gain collectively and quoted the Minister of Agriculture’s statement in the legislature 
that the Act “does not extend collective bargaining to agricultural workers”.53 In brief, 
Winkler CJO concluded that the Act failed to protect the associational right to bar­
gain collectively because it failed to impose an obligation on employers to bargain 
in good faith and because of the weakness of the “enforcement mechanism” in terms 
of the Tribunal, a body without expertise in labour relations and no requirement of 
such expertise. Significantly, the Court rejected the argument of government counsel 
that freedom of association does not require employee representation to be “based 
on the principles of majoritarianism and exclusivity”.54 Considering the history of 
Canadian labour relations, Winkler CJ.O. found that exclusivity ensures workers a 
unified voice which “is essential to ensure... balance of power” between employer and 
workers.55 Thus, the Court confirmed the value of majority support in the selection 
of the workers’ representative association combined with the ability of that repre­
sentative association to be the exclusive voice on their behalf with respect to serious 
workplace issues. As in Dunmore, the wholesale exclusion of agricultural workers 
from access to collective bargaining did not satisfy the rational connection step of 
the Oakes justification analysis in relation to the pressing and substantial legislative 
goal of protecting the family farm and promoting farm productivity and certainly did 
not satisfy minimal impairment. As had the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunmore, 
Winkler CJO noted that agricultural workers in other provinces, like New Bruns­
wick, enjoyed collective bargaining protection essentially ‘where numbers warrant’.
The Ontario Court of Appeal granted the requested declara- 
tion of invalidity with costs but suspended its declaration for twelve months
52 S.O. 2002, c. 16.
53 Winkler CJO first applied the Dunmore criteria discussed in Baier v. Alberta, 2007 SCC 31 , [2007] 2 
S.C.R. 673 to determine that the agricultural workers were asserting a positive claim to government action 
to protect their associational right to access collective bargaining in general and not to access a specific 
legislative scheme; Supra, note 50 at para. 62 quoting Ontario Hansard.
54 Ibid., at para. 86 et seq.
55 Ibid., at para. 91.
to permit the government and legislature to attempt yet again to protect the 
right of these workers to engage in “meaningful collective bargaining”.56
CONCLUSION
This comment began with references to anniversaries of particular significance to 
organized labour in Canada and now this conclusion begins with mention of an­
other. Seventy-two years after the U.S. Congress enacted the Wagner Act to protect 
the right of private sector workers to organize unions and to collective bargaining; 
the Supreme Court of Canada in B.C. Health Services reversed its prior jurispru­
dence and recognized good faith collective bargaining as also protected by free­
dom of association in the labour context. B.C. Health Services concerned public 
sector collective bargaining and the Court was conscious of this specific context.57
Public sector collective bargaining involves government as the employer and, 
therefore, triggers application of the Charter because of section 32, the application 
provision of the Charter. The question logically arises whether this new constitutional 
protection of collective bargaining is also protected by the freedom of association 
enjoyed by private sector workers. In other words, does good faith collective bar­
gaining in the private sector exist as a statutory right under federal and provincial 
labour codes or is it constitutionally mandated? If constitutionally mandated, is it dir­
ect in the sense that the requisite “government action” is found in the enactment of 
such legislation or is it indirect in the sense of application of informing Charter values 
in the Dolphin Deliveryi8 sense (though recognizing that the Dolphin Delivery analy­
sis applied to development of the common law)? Expressed still another way, does 
the Charter impose a constitutionally mandated obligation of good faith bargaining 
on private sector employers? The answer to these questions—which are really the 
same—is found in B.C. Health Services itself. McLachlin CJC and LeBel J carefully 
distinguished the two Charter section 32 situations of govemment-as-employer and 
govemment-as-legislator. They concluded that B. C. Health Services presented not the 
govemment-as-employer situation (because of the lack of any such allegation relating 
to the breach of the right) but a situation of govemment-as-legislator. Thus, by enact­
ing legislation protective of the freedom of association in the labour context, the legis­
lature was bound to protect the procedural aspects of good faith collective bargaining.
Of the decisions recounted above, only three concerned private sec­
tor workers: the challenge to the prostitution provisions of the Criminal Code, 
the Wal-Mart situation, and the attempted use of a cooperative as the representa­
tive vehicle for mill workers. Thus, the now reserved Wal-Mart appeal to the Su­
preme Court of Canada is anxiously awaited for what it will indicate about free­
dom of association in the private sector—assuming it even gets to that point.
56 Ibid., at para. 139.
57 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S. Code § 151 et seq (5 July 1935); 1937; Consider B.C. Health 
Services, supra, note 1, para. 87 et seq.
58 Dolphin Delivery Ltd. v. R.W.D.S.U., Local 580, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
At the same time, Delisle deserves reconsideration. The oft-repeated state­
ment from Delisle that freedom of association does not protect a preferred form of 
association is used perfunctorily in the decisions to justify dismissal of a claim to a 
specific form of association. Yet, that form may also indicate substance is reflected in 
Fraser wherein the Ontario Court of Appeal accepted that majority support results in 
exclusive representation. The proposition that freedom of association does not pro­
tect access to a specific legislative scheme of association appears self-evident but any 
limitation on the claim to a specific form or vehicle of association should be justified 
under the Charter, section 1. To date, court and tribunal decisions appear to accept 
labour relations legislation as per se justified per the Charter, section 1 and seek to 
protect the internal integrity of that regime. It should not be so. If a group seeks to 
associate in a particular form of association—even with the characteristics but not 
the legality of a formally certified association—surely, the state should justify why 
that choice as to the form of associational vehicle is not to be respected in a free and 
democratic society.
Doubtless, Canadians have entered an era of renewed apprecia­
tion for freedom of association. How far that takes us as a free and demo­
cratic society awaits the future and the persuasiveness of the legal community.
